[© 최광민] 자유: 엘뤼아르와 두 존 M.들

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© 최광민, Kwangmin Choi, 2003-06-20

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[© 최광민] 자유: 엘뤼아르와 두 존 "M"들

순서

1. 뽈 엘뤼아르의, 자유
2. 두 John "M"
1. 존 밀턴의, 자유
2. 존 스튜어트 밀의, 자유

{A Seated Slave}, Wikimedia Commons

자유 / Liberte

- 뽈 엘뤼아르

나의 학습 노트 위에

나의 책상과 나무 위에

모래 위에 눈 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

내가 읽은 모든 책장 위에

모든 백지 위에

돌과 피와 종이와 재 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

황금빛 조각 위에

병사들의 총칼 위에

제왕들의 왕관 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

밀림과 사막 위에

새둥우리 위에 금작화 나무 위에

내 어린 시절 메아리 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

밤의 경이 위에

일상의 흰 빵 위에

약혼 시절 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

나의 하늘빛 옷자락 위에

태양이 녹슬은 연못 위에

달빛이 싱싱한 호수 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

들판 위에 지평선 위에

새들의 날개 위에

그리고 그늘진 풍차 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

새벽의 입김 위에

바다 위에 배 위에

미친 듯한 산 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

구름의 거품 위에

폭풍의 땀방울 위에

굵고 멋없는 빗방울 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

반짝이는 모든 것 위에

여러 빛깔의 종들 위에

구체적인 진실 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

살포시 깨어난 오솔길 위에

곧게 뻗어나간 큰 길 위에

넘치는 광장 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

불켜진 램프 위에

불꺼진 램프 위에

모여 앉은 나의 가족들 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

돌로 쪼갠 과일 위에

거울과 나의 방 위에

빈 조개 껍질 내 침대 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

게걸스럽고 귀여운 나의 강아지 위에

그의 곤두선 양쪽 귀 위에

그의 뒤뚱거리는 발걸음 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

내 문의 발판 위에

낯익은 물건 위에

축복된 불길 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

균형잡힌 모든 육체 위에

내 친구들의 이마 위에

건네는 모든 손길 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

놀라운 소식이 담긴 창가에

기장된 입술 위에

침묵을 초월한 곳에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

파괴된 내 안식처 위에

무너진 내 등대불 위에

내 권태의 벽 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

욕망 없는 부재 위에

벌거벗은 고독 위에

죽음의 계단 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다

회복된 건강 위에

사라진 위험 위에

회상없는 희망 위에

나는 너의 이름을 쓴다.

그 한마디 말의 힘으로

나는 내 일생을 다시 시작한다

나는 태어났다 너를 알기 위해서

너의 이름을 부르기 위해서

自由여 !

"자유"에 관해 두 명의 "존 M."은 명문을 남겼다. 하나는 17세기의 영국 문필가 존 밀턴의 {아레오파기티카}, 다른 하나는 19세기 자유사상가 존 스튜어트 밀의 {자유론}이다.

밀턴은 출판물을 통한 표현의 자유와 권력에 의한 검열의 부당성에 대해, 밀은 보다 일반적인 개인의 자유에 대해 논한다. 두 사람 다 최대한의 자유를 주장하지만, "완벽한" 자유를 주장한 것은 아니다. 권력의 개입과 간섭은 최소화 되어야 하겠지만 역시 제한이 따른다. 밀턴의 입장은 "진리를 추구하는 한"이란 표현으로 정리될 수 있다.



{Areopagitica}, John Milton
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/608

...And therefore Lucretius without impeachment versifies his Epicurism to Memmius, and had the honour to be set forth the second time by Cicero, so great a father of the Commonwealth; although himself disputes against that opinion in his own writings. Nor was the satirical sharpness or naked plainness of Lucilius, or Catullus, or Flaccus, by any order prohibited. And for matters of state, the story of Titus Livius, though it extolled that part which Pompey held, was not therefore suppressed by Octavius Caesar of the other faction. But that Naso was by him banished in his old age, for the wanton poems of his youth, was but a mere covert of state over some secret cause: and besides, the books were neither banished nor called in. From hence we shall meet with little else but tyranny in the Roman empire, that we may not marvel, if not so often bad as good books were silenced. I shall therefore deem to have been large enough, in producing what among the ancients was punishable to write; save only which, all other arguments were free to treat on.

By this time the emperors were become Christians, whose discipline in this point I do not find to have been more severe than what was formerly in practice. The books of those whom they took to be grand heretics were examined, refuted, and condemned in the general Councils; and not till then were prohibited, or burnt, by authority of the emperor. As for the writings of heathen authors, unless they were plain invectives against Christianity, as those of Porphyrius and Proclus, they met with no interdict that can be cited, till about the year 400, in a Carthaginian Council, wherein bishops themselves were forbid to read the books of Gentiles, but heresies they might read: while others long before them, on the contrary, scrupled more the books of heretics than of Gentiles. And that the primitive Councils and bishops were wont only to declare what books were not commendable, passing no further, but leaving it to each one's conscience to read or to lay by, till after the year 800, is observed already by Padre Paolo, the great unmasker of the Trentine Council.

After which time the Popes of Rome, engrossing what they pleased of political rule into their own hands, extended their dominion over men's eyes, as they had before over their judgments, burning and prohibiting to be read what they fancied not; yet sparing in their censures, and the books not many which they so dealt with: till Martin V., by his bull, not only prohibited, but was the first that excommunicated the reading of heretical books; for about that time Wickliffe and Huss, growing terrible, were they who first drove the Papal Court to a stricter policy of prohibiting. Which course Leo X. and his successors followed, until the Council of Trent and the Spanish Inquisition engendering together brought forth, or perfected, those Catalogues and expurging Indexes, that rake through the entrails of many an old good author, with a violation worse than any could be offered to his tomb. Nor did they stay in matters heretical, but any subject that was not to their palate, they either condemned in a Prohibition, or had it straight into the new purgatory of an index....

이보다는 밀이 자유의 상한선을 보다 명확하게 제시하는데, "That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others., 즉, "문명사회의 다른 구성원에게 위해하지 않은 한" 개인의 자유는 최대치로 보장되어야 한다는 것이다. 물론 "진리", "타자에 대한 위해" 혹은 "위해의 정도"를 어떻게 정의하는가의 기준이 사람마다 다를테니, 이 또한 완벽한 정의라고 할 수는 없을 것이다.


{On Liberty}, John Stuart Mill
http://www.econlib.org/library/Mill/mlLbty.html

...The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant...

....To pass from this to the only other instance of judicial iniquity, the mention of which, after the condemnation of Socrates, would not be an anti-climax: the event which took place on Calvary rather more than eighteen hundred years ago. The man who left on the memory of those who witnessed his life and conversation, such an impression of his moral grandeur, that eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage to him as the Almighty in person, was ignominiously put to death, as what? As a blasphemer. Men did not merely mistake their benefactor; they mistook him for the exact contrary of what he was, and treated him as that prodigy of impiety, which they themselves are now held to be, for their treatment of him. The feelings with which mankind now regard these lamentable transactions, especially the later of the two, render them extremely unjust in their judgment of the unhappy actors. These were, to all appearance, not bad men—not worse than men most commonly are, but rather the contrary; men who possessed in a full, or somewhat more than a full measure, the religious, moral, and patriotic feelings of their time and people: the very kind of men who, in all times, our own included, have every chance of passing through life blameless and respected. The high-priest who rent his garments when the words were pronounced, which, according to all the ideas of his country, constituted the blackest guilt, was in all probability quite as sincere in his horror and indignation, as the generality of respectable and pious men now are in the religious and moral sentiments they profess; and most of those who now shudder at his conduct, if they had lived in his time, and been born Jews, would have acted precisely as he did. Orthodox Christians who are tempted to think that those who stoned to death the first martyrs must have been worse men than they themselves are, ought to remember that one of those persecutors was Saint Paul...

...Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant — society collectively over the separate individuals who compose it — its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates; and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development and, if possible, prevent the formation of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs as protection against political despotism...

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